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WHAT DOES THE CONSTITUTION SAY ABOUT VOUCHERS?
by John H. Garvey
A number of cities and states, dissatisfied with the
performance of their public schools, have started voucher
programs to give parents some choice in the education of their
children, and to provide a competitive stimulus to public
schools. Vouchers have always had an appeal for parents of
parochial school children, who have religious reasons for
seeking an alternative to public education. But nowadays
they also appeal to parents - often Latino and African-Ameri-
can - whose children are trapped in underperforming city
schools. The idea has surfaced in the presidential election
campaign already under way. Senator Bradley once supported
the notion, though it may have cost him the endorsement of
the teachers' unions. John McCain has proposed a three-year,
$5.4 billion voucher demonstration project. Texas Governor
George W. Bush has suggested using Title I money or federal
block grants for private-school tuition. Governor Jeb Bush got
a state plan enacted this year for the worst schools in Florida.'
When voucher plans include parochial schools (and they
typically do), they are routinely challenged on constitutional
grounds. Last year the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld
Milwaukee's Parental Choice Program, against a charge that it
violated the establishment clause of the United States Constitu-
tion.2 This year the Ohio Supreme Court rejected a similar
claim against the Ohio Pilot Scholarship Program, though it held
the program invalid on state law grounds.' Maine used to
include parochial schools in its voucher program. In 1981 it
made them ineligible - though all other public and private
schools can participate. Parochial school parents have attacked
this exclusion as a violation of the free exercise and free speech
clauses - claims rejected this year by both the state supreme
court and the First Circuit.4 Vermont has a rather similar story.
The United States Supreme Court thus far has declined to take
the matter up. I would like to speculate about what it might
decide if it ever did get involved. To give a one sentence
summary of my conclusions, I think it should hold that voucher
plans do not violate the establishment clause, and that some-
times (though maybe not always) excluding religious schools
can violate the free exercise and free speech clauses.
I. May a Voucher Program Include Parochial Schools?
1. The GI Bill
Let me begin with an example of a voucher plan that we
all approve of, and that has always applied to religious
schools. The GI bill has never distinguished between reli-
gious and secular schools. Veterans have been able to take
their education benefit and spend it where they have pleased.
This program has several features that explain its wide appeal.
In the first place it rewards veterans for service to their
country. I don't mean to suggest that we are willing to wink
at a constitutional violation because it's done in a good cause.
I mention this instead because it shows that the government
has no intention of helping religious institutions.6 A second
feature of the GI bill that underscores
the same point is this: the benefits go
to a large and diverse class. It is not a
religious gerrymander. Veterans
represent all shades of belief and
unbelief. Lemon v. Kurtzman holds
that a law must have a secular purpose to survive under the
establishment clause.7 These first two features bear on that
point.
A third feature that accounts for the popularity of the GI bill
is this: the student chooses the school where he or she will
spend the money. This means the program does little to affect
the distribution of students within the universe of colleges and
universities. Students are (we hope) more likely to attend
college than they were before. But they will not find religious
schools more attractive, relative to their competitors, than they
were before. The GI bill does not affect the students' religios-
ity by enticing them into religious programs. Nor does it affect
the religious behavior of institutions by tying benefits to a
certain pattern of religious (or secular) behavior. Any changes
in religious activity result from private choices made by
veterans about where to spend their money. This is what we
call in tort law an intervening cause. The government is not
responsible for causing religious effects; the GI is. This satisfies
the second part of the Lemon test: the law does not have the
primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.'
No one would argue that Social Security benefits are
unconstitutional because recipients might put them in the
collection basket. The GI bill is even less objectionable in
this regard. Because it is restricted aid (it can only be spent
for a certain purpose), the public is assured that it will get
full secular value for its money.9 The veteran has to use it to
buy an education. It's true that the school might infuse that
product with a religious spirit. But it's still a college degree:
a set of skills, a useful credential in the job market, a
preparation for self-sufficiency in the civilian world, etc.
2. Witters
Little wonder that when the Supreme Court finally consid-
ered a plan like the GI bill it unanimously upheld it. Witters v.
Washington Department of Services for the Blincf0 was about a
state vocational rehabilitation aid plan for blind people. Witters
wanted to use his grant at the Inland Empire School of the
Bible, a private Christian college, where he was studying to
become a minister. Justice Marshall emphasized the points I
have mentioned: [i] The program was designed to help the
blind. It was not a sham, secretly engineered to benefit
seminaries. [ii] Blindness afflicts people of all shades of belief.
Only a few are likely to attend seminaries. This too supports
the state's bona fides: the program would be a terribly ineffi-
cient way of conveying funds to religious schools. [iii] Students
could spend the aid where they wished. So the program did
not skew students' religious choices (by making religious
schools relatively more attractive than others). Nor did it affect
religious behavior of institutions (by tying money to a specific
course of conduct). The program was religiously neutral.
There were several concurring opinions in Witters, and
though no one came right out and said it, they were con-
cerned about the significance of point [ii]. Justice Marshall's
opinion suggested that it was relevant to Lemon's effects
test, not just its purpose requirement. He implied (though
he did not say) that even if the Washington plan had an
unimpeachable secular purpose, it might be unconstitutional
if too many students chose to spend their money at religious
schools. On this point five justices concurred separately."
3. Vouchers
Let us see now whether these principles apply in the
same way to the kind of voucher programs that we find in
states like Wisconsin, Ohio, and Florida. There are, I think,
two relevant differences that crop up in elementary and
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secondary schools. The first is that the students are younger.
The second is that religious schools might make up a greater
fraction of the participating institutions.
Before I discuss the first of these two points, I want to
mention a difference that is not relevant in the comparison of
higher and lower education. It is often said, sometimes rightly,
that religion infuses parochial school education to a greater
degree than it does the curriculum at religious colleges and
universities.2 This observation is said to have some bearing on
the constitutionality of school aid. If the constitution requires
some kind of strict separation, this might be possible in a
college chemistry class but not in junior high science. And so
it might be OK for the National Science Foundation to build a
chemistry lab at Georgetown or give a fellowship to one of its
faculty, but not OK to do the same things at St. Monica's
elementary school. But this observation has no bearing on the
comparison we are making. Religion might be off in a corner
at Georgetown, but it's still there, and veterans can take their
GI benefits anywhere in the university. They can major in
theology as well as chemistry. In fact that is what Larry Witters
was allowed to do. This form of aid is constitutional in colleges
not because it never finds its way into religious pockets, but
because it is the students who choose to direct it there.
Does it matter that the students in Wisconsin's and Ohio's
and Florida's voucher programs are younger than war veterans
and seminary students? Some say it is. The Supreme Court
made something of this the day it decided Lemon and Tilton v.
Richardson, 3 which upheld construction grants to religious
colleges:
[C]ollege students are less impressionable and less
susceptible to religious indoctrination. Common
observation would seem to support that view, and
Congress may well have entertained it. The skepti-
cism of the college student is not an inconsiderable
barrier to any attempt or tendency to subvert the
congressional objectives and limitations.
When the Court spoke of Congress's "objectives and
limitations" it had this in mind: the Higher Education Facili-
ties Act is designed to help schools pay for science buildings,
language labs, etc. It is not supposed to pay for buildings
used for sectarian instruction or religious worship. Tilton
suggests that because college students are sophisticated, they
won't stand for science teachers in the federally funded
building trying to pass off creationism as legitimate science.
This might be true. But even if it is, it turns out to be just
a variation on the last argument. Let us suppose that sophisti-
cated students at religious schools will help in enforcing the
rule that says religion must stay in its proper place - the
chapel, the divinity school, perhaps the theology department.
That vigilance is not what makes the GI bill (or aid to the blind)
constitutional; the student holding that kind of aid can attend
chapel daily, major in theology, and become a minister. The
saving feature of college tuition aid is that the student makes
the decision about where to spend it . . . so if the money finds
its way into religious pockets at the university, that effect has
an intervening cause. Vouchers for little kids have this same
feature. It doesn't matter if they are more susceptible to
religious persuasion. The key thing is that their parents make
the choice about whether to buy that kind of education or not.
The other difference between college and lower school
vouchers is this. Most colleges and universities in America
are not religious; veterans can go to any of them. Justice
Marshall in Witters said there was no evidence "that any other
person has ever sought to finance religious education . . .
pursuant to the State's program."' 4 Would it matter if most of
the institutions participating in a voucher program were
religious? Sloan v. Lemon" says it might. Two months after
the Supreme Court decided Lemon v. Kurtzman, Pennsylvania
enacted the Parent Reimbursement Act for Nonpublic Educa-
tion, which reimbursed parents up to $150 for tuition paid to
private schools" - a kind of proto-voucher plan. More than
90% of the private school population in Pennsylvania attended
religious schools. The Supreme Court held the plan unconsti-
tutional, saying: 7
The State has singled out a class of its citizens for
a special economic benefit. Whether that benefit be
viewed as a simple tuition subsidy, as an incentive to
parents to send their children to sectarian schools, or
as a reward for having done so, at bottom its intended
consequence is to preserve and support religion-
oriented institutions. [T]his is quite unlike the . . .
benefits that flowed to sectarian schools from pro-
grams aiding all parents by supplying bus transporta-
tion and secular textbooks for their children.
You can imagine a similar claim being made about current
voucher programs. The one Ohio adopted in 1996 offered
$5.25 million to low-income Cleveland children in K-3.
Recipients could spend the vouchers at 43 different private
schools; 42 of them were religious. 8 The Milwaukee Parental
Choice Program adopted in 1990 allowed a limited number of
poor K-12 students to attend private school. For each partici-
pating student the state would divert $2500 from the Milwau-
kee Public Schools to the private school. Parochial schools
were at first excluded (a point I examine below), but they
were added by the 1995-96 Budget Act, and if allowed to take
part, they will absorb a large number of the participating
students. What bearing does this have on their constitutional-
ity?
I confess that they are hard to distinguish from Sloan. If
you are careful about how you describe a voucher plan it is
possible to skate around the problem. Pennsylvania in Sloan
called its act Parental Reimbursement for Nonpublic Education.
Parochial schools represented 90%, roughly speaking, of the
participating institutions, because the denominator was 'all
private schools.' But if you describe your voucher program as a
plan that gives each student $2500 for tuition at 'any school
public or private,' the denominator is much larger, and the
program is indistinguishable from the GI bill.
Nor would it matter if, as a matter of fact, most of the
participating students spent their vouchers at private, even
parochial, schools. That's how it was with the tuition benefit
in Mueller v. Allen' 9 (a tax deduction rather than a grant).
The Court said that it was constitutional because it was
formally available to "all parents - whether their children
attend public school or private." 20 And this result would not
vary from year to year with parents' choices. "We would be
loath to adopt a rule grounding the constitutionality of a
facially neutral law on annual reports reciting the extent to
which various classes of private citizens claimed benefits
under the law."
2'
Perhaps we should just say that Witters has overruled Sloan
and leave it at that. The distinction between private school
tuition grants and all-school vouchers is pretty flimsy when you
recall that public school is a free option in both cases. It is, in the
phrase I have used, always in the denominator even if it's not
discussed in the statute that creates the tuition payment program.
Why should that formality be of constitutional significance? I
don't have a good answer. Maybe it's like Minneapolis Star v.
Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue,22 where the Court struck
down a special use tax for newspapers. This was not a law passed
to get newspapers.2 3 Indeed it was lower than the general use
tax for other forms of tangible personal property, and the Court
said it would be OK to make papers pay that one. The idea was
that the political process would protect the press better if any law
affecting it had to be addressed to a large crowd. How does this
Continued on page 31
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apply to Sloan? We might say that any school aid law has to put
private and public schools together so we can be perfectly sure
we don't have any favoritism.
II. Must a Voucher Program Include Parochial Schools?
I would not say, as some might, that the constitution requires
aid to parochial schools. I think it is OK for New York to run a
system of public schools and leave it at that.24 But when the state
provides funds for every type of school but religious schools I
think the rule is different. Thus I would say that Wisconsin's
current voucher law (which includes parochial schools) is constitu-
tional, but its 1990 predecessor (which included only nonreligious
private schools) was not. And I am concerned for the same reason
about the laws in Maine and Vermont excluding only religious
schools from voucher programs.
This is a question governed by free speech and free
exercise law, not establishment clause law. The background
rule is this: when the government speaks it is entitled to
confine its remarks to a particular subject, and even to take a
particular point of view. This, after all, is why we elect a
president and a congress. It is a bit like the "market partici-
pant" exception to the commerce clause: when the govern-
ment acts as a participant rather than as a regulator it can do as
it likes. It can even discriminate. The president can come
out in favor of peace in Northern Ireland and against restrictions
on partial birth abortion. The public schools can teach that
democracy is a good thing and race discrimination is bad.
The danger we run in thinking of the government as a
market participant is that there is no limit to the government's
market power.26 It could conceivably buy up all the newspa-
pers, radio and TV stations, parks, libraries, etc. (unlike the rest
of us, it has the power to tax), and then hand them out to its
friends. So in free speech law we distinguish between cases
where the government itself speaks, and cases where the
government hands out scarce resources to speakers. In the latter
group of cases (public forum cases) we say that the government,
like a private owner, can sometimes restrict the uses of its
property. It can reserve it for the discussion of certain topics.
For example, NEH can give grants for essays about the bicenten-
nial. Boston can hold school board meetings but not political
rallies in its public school gymnasiums. But it cannot discrimi-
nate on the basis of viewpoint. Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free School Dist.27 held that the school district
could not, when it opened classrooms for discussions about child
rearing, exclude people who wanted to discuss the subject from
a religious point of view. And Rosenberger v. Recto25 held that
this rule even extended to cases where the government was
handing out money rather than regulating access to public
places. The University of Virginia funded student news,
information, and opinion media groups (it paid their printing
bills), but it refused to pay for a magazine that discussed things
like racism, pregnancy, eating disorders, and music from a
Christian point of view. The university tried to defend its action
by saying that it was making a judgment based on content, not
viewpoint - all discussions of religious thought, pro and con,
were off limits. 'But the Court rightly responded:
29
Religion may be a vast area of inquiry, but it also
provides, as it did here, a specific premise, a perspec-
tive, a standpoint from which a variety of subjects
may be discussed and considered. The prohibited
perspective, not the general subject matter, resulted
in the refusal to make third-party payments, for the
subjects discussed were otherwise within the ap-
proved category of publications.
You can make an even better case for this proposition in
the case of parochial schools. They teach the same subjects
as other private and public schools.3 0 The big difference is
that they teach them from a religious point of view. When
the government funds all public and private schools except
parochial schools, it is doing the same thing the University of
Virginia did in Rosenberger.
Though this seems indisputable to me, I confess to some
lingering doubts. There is a fine line between Rosenberger and
another strand of government funding cases. Rust v. Sullivan, 1
for example, held that HHS, in funding family planning pro-
grams, could refuse to fund those that discussed or promoted
abortion. These are pretty hard to tell apart. We might say that
Rosenberger involves a program to encourage private speech,
whereas in Rust the state enlists private speakers to convey a
message that it has written. But if that is the only difference,
why couldn't the University of Virginia announce that it was
funding student publications to convey a secular message?
Perhaps we might better say that Rust upheld a program whose
point was action (family planning), not talk. The first amend-
ment can't possibly require the government, whenever it funds a
program, to give equal support to the program's opponents. It is
not viewpoint control in the first amendment sense to ban sales
of cigarettes to minors without giving equal support to tobacco
companies. Nor to restrict logging on federal lands without
supporting timber interests.
IlI. Conclusion
I should caution readers who might be sympathetic to my
message that I have seldom been right in predicting the out-
come of litigation in the Supreme Court. The best bet might be
the opposite of what I say. And I need to add that I have only
been discussing constitutional questions. It is another, and to
my mind a more difficult, question whether parochial schools
should want to get government aid. There is a real danger that
they will be tempted to adjust their teaching in order to attract
the maximum degree of public support. And that would be a
more serious loss than defeat on the constitutional issues.
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the forum state] would, in effect, create national (or
even worldwide) jurisdiction, so that every plaintiff
could sue in plaintiff's home court every out-of-state
defendant who established an Internet web site.3 2
While Hasbro and Digital nonetheless showed signs of
certain "spider web"-like language,3 3 at least one recent
Superior Court decision flatly rejected that approach. In
Commerce & Industry Insurance Co. v. E.I. duPont de
Nemours & Co.,34 the court declined to exercise either specific
or general jurisdiction based on the defendant's relatively non-
interactive website. In Commerce, the plaintiffs asserted
claims based on the provision by the defendants' subsidiaries
of fire protection equipment and systems which were involved
in the Malden Mills fire. In dismissing the complaint, the
court accepted defendants' arguments that the website was a
Iipassive" one which merely contained information about the
company, and for which the only "interactivity" was the
prominent display of its e-mail address, the encouragement of
comments to be sent via e-mail, and the ability to request the
company's financial information.3 5
Some Practical Advice
Given the vagaries of the current status of the case law,
is there nothing a website owner might do to avoid being
sued in any state from which its site can be accessed? Other
than operating a wholly passive website (which may work
wonders for avoiding a lawsuit in Yuma, but may do little for
generating sales), the following measures will help in
limiting exposure to suit in other states:
Make sure that any website activity which results
in a contract - for example, an order or a subscrip-
tion form - clearly states that the contract is not
complete until the company accepts it, and that it
will be completed in the company's home state.
Consider also including a forum selection clause,
stating that any disputes arising out of the transaction
will be governed by your home state's law and
litigated there.
If you are posting job openings on your website,
be sure to state that your hiring practices comply with
both federal and your home state's law, that any
resulting employment agreement will be completed in
your home state, and that any disputes arising out of
the hiring and employment relationship will be
governed by your home state's law and litigated there.
These suggestions may not assure the avoidance of
lawsuits in other states. Incorporating such suggestions,
however, may go a long way towards demonstrating that the
company did not purposefully avail itself of the privileges of
doing business in a foreign state, and that it therefore did
not seek to invoke the benefits and protections of that
state's laws.
Conclusion
So what does all of this mean? First and foremost, those
who post websites should be aware that Internet activity has
the potential for exposing them to suit in multiple states
under varying state laws, many of which could produce
widely varying outcomes. There is an inherent tension
between promoting commercial activity and minimizing
exposure to suit in other states: the more actively one
engages in soliciting business via a website with customers or
site visitors from other states, the more likely one is to be
sued in and subjected to the substantive law of those states.
A passive website - one that merely conveys information
and does not solicit business and where only the user is
"traveling" to the website - is much less likely to support a
finding of personal jurisdiction, although it may not be
particularly good for sales. Nonetheless, site owners can still
incorporate a variety of tools, such as forum selection clauses,
to minimize their exposure. One thing, however, is quite
certain: as courts continue to develop the law of Internet
jurisdiction under the Constitution over the next several
years, we certainly will have more answers. But we just as
certainly will have more questions by then, too.
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